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URING the Survey period, the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various rules of civil evidence. The
cases of greatest significance arose in the following substantive ar-
eas: (1) Article I - General Provisions; (2) Article II - Judicial Notice; (3)
Burden of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; (4) Article IV - Relevancy
and Its Limits; (5) Article V - Privileges; (6) Article VI - Witnesses; (7)
Article VII - Opinions and Expert Testimony; (8) Article VIII - Hearsay;
(9) Article IX - Authentication and Identification; (10) Article X - Con-
tents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs; and (11) Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a) provides that error may not be predi-
cated on a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected.1 Reversible error does not usually occur in connec-
tion with rulings on questions of evidence unless the complaining party can
demonstrate that the whole case turns on the particular evidence admitted or
excluded. 2 In Service Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Martin3 the Dallas Court of
Appeals, citing Rule 103, implied that a substantial right of the party had
not been affected because the excluded evidence about which appellant com-
plained on appeal was not admissible. 4
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that error may not be
predicated on a ruling admitting evidence absent a timely objection or mo-
tion to strike.5 During the Survey period, three courts held that failure to
object waived any complaint on appeal. 6
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that error may not be
* J.D., University of Texas; Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Houston, Texas.
1. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a).
2. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 837 (Tex. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
3. 855 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
4. Id. at 822-23.
5. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a)(1).
6. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136, 149 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ requested) (failure to timely object to expert opinion testimony); De La Garza v.
Salazar, 851 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (failing to object to
informal presentation of evidence to the court in a nonjury case failed to preserve the right to
complain about the absence of sworn evidence); In re A.V., 849 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (appellant's failure to object to prior introduction of a doctor's
report about test results waived any complaint regarding subsequent testimony about the test
results).
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predicated upon a ruling admitting or excluding evidence unless a substan-
tial right of a party is affected and the substance of the evidence was made
known to the court by offer. 7 In Hood v. Hays County,8 a county's suit
against a taxpayer to recover property taxes and to foreclose a lien securing
payment of the taxes, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the taxpayer
had properly preserved her complaint for review by offering testimony as to
the value of the property in 1987 and 1988. In Weng Enterprise, Inc. v.
Embassy World Travel, Inc.9 the Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals found
that although the trial court had abused its discretion by precluding a wit-
ness from testifying, appellant failed to preserve error by failing to make a
bill of exception or offer of proof demonstrating the substance of the ex-
cluded testimony to the appellate court.
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 104(a) provides that preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness shall be determined
by the court.10 In Warner v. Hurt " the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Ap-
peals rejected the appellant's argument that an expert's testimony in a medi-
cal malpractice case should be excluded if the expert cannot define the
standard of care. The Warner court explained that such a failure may ulti-
mately go to the weight of the expert's testimony, but not to its admissibility,
nor to the qualification of the witness to testify. 12
Rule 104(a) also provides that preliminary questions concerning the ad-
missibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. 13 In In re A. V 14 the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a trial court had not abused its dis-
cretion in determining that a witness who held an advanced degree in science
and social work and whose job consisted of attempting to rehabilitate ac-
cused sex offenders qualified as an expert witness, particularly in the absence
of an appropriate objection. 15
The admissibility of a photograph is conditioned upon its identification by
a witness as a correct portrayal of the facts. 16 In Reichhold Chemical, Inc. v.
Puremco Manufacturing Co. 17 the Waco Court of Appeals held that where
the identifying witness testified that the photographs did not show the true
condition of an underground storage tank at the relevant time, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the photographs.' 8
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Association, Ltd. 19 the
Austin Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
7. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 103(a)(2).
8. 836 S.W.2d 327, 328-29 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
9. 837 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
10. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 104(a).
11. 834 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
12. Id. at 407.
13. TEX. R. COv. EvID. 104(a).
14. 849 S.W.2d 393.
15. Id. at 398.
16. Davidson v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Tex. 1987).
17. 854 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
18. Id. at 248.
19. 839 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted).
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in admitting the pleadings of a party from a prior lawsuit.20 The pleadings
were admitted to prove the party had once taken a position contradictory to
its position in the present case. The court noted that the party made no
objections to the admission of the pleading, nor did it request any type of
limiting instruction.21
The facts or data on which an expert witness bases an opinion need not be
admissible "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in
forming opinions .... -22 Whether experts in the field reasonably rely on
such data is a matter for preliminary determination by the trial court pursu-
ant to Rule 104(a). One court during the Survey period held that the appel-
late court looks to the entire record in reviewing the trial court's preliminary
determination. 23
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 104(b) governs relevancy conditioned on
fact.24 Rule 104(b) is the authority for the practice known as "connecting
up" evidenced later. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cordova25 the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that in permitting plaintiff's expert to testify out of
order about Wal-Mart's net worth, the trial court was led into error by the
representation of plaintiff's attorney that he would prove a prima facie case
of gross negligence later.26 The El Paso court held that in the absence of
such prima facie evidence of gross negligence, it was reversible error to ad-
mit expert testimony regarding net worth of the defendant. 27
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 105(a) provides that when evidence admissi-
ble as to one party or for one purpose but not as to another party or for
another purpose is admitted, the court shall limit the evidence to its proper
scope by giving a limiting instruction if so requested. 28 In Cigna Insurance
Co. v. Evans29 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that where the opponent
of the evidence had not requested a limiting instruction and the court did not
give one, the jury was entitled to consider the evidence for any and all pur-
poses.30 In City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.31 the Dallas
Court of Appeals wrote that it is the opponent's burden to obtain the limit-
ing instruction, and that absent a request for a limiting instruction, the ad-
mission of the evidence without limitation is not a ground for complaint on
20. Id. at 874.
21. Id.
22. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 703.
23. St. Paul Medical Ctr. v. Cecil, 842 S.W.2d 808, 815-16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no
writ) (expert witness formulating treatment plan in determining special education and rehabili-
tation costs for damage award properly relied upon tuition costs obtained from special schools,
where he testified that he and other experts routinely rely on costs obtained from schools to
prepare treatment plan and to adapt plans to their patients available resources).
24. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 104(b).
25. 856 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ requested).
26. Id. at 772-73.
27. Id. at 773-74.
28. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 105(a).
29. 847 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
30. Id. at 421.




No rule requires that a deposition be read or played to the jury in the
chronological sequence in which it was taken. For the second time in two
years, a Texas appellate court has held that extensively edited videotaped
deposition testimony was admissible. 33 The court stated there was no harm
to the opponent because the trial court allowed the opponent to present its
own videotape of the same witness immediately following the showing of the
edited videotaped deposition. 34
II. ARTICLE II - JUDICIAL NOTICE
To be the proper subject of judicial notice, a fact must not be subject to
reasonable dispute because "it is either (1) generally known within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready de-
termination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned." '3 5 During the Survey period, courts found various topics im-
proper for judicial notice. Such a topic included whether the cities of Beau-
mont, Port Arthur, and Orange, Texas, were in the same metropolitan area
for purposes of enforcing a covenant not to compete. 36 In addition, in an
equitable bill of review proceeding brought to challenge the dismissal of a
case for want of prosecution, a court of appeals found that it was improper
for the trial court to take judicial notice of what had occurred at the sum-
mary judgment hearing, where the parties disputed what had happened at
the hearing, and the hearing was not recorded. 37 The court explained that
personal knowledge is not judicial knowledge and that a judge may person-
ally know a fact of which she may not properly take judicial notice.38 An-
other court took judicial notice of a final judgment in another case because it
had been asked by stipulation of the parties to do so, but noted that in gen-
eral a court cannot judicially notice the records of another court. 39 Whether
a county court at law was a "statutory probate court" was a fact that could
be determined by a resort to state law, and because it was capable of accurate
determination from sources whose accuracy could not reasonably be ques-
tioned, it was held to be an adjudicative fact that could be judicially
noticed. o
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 201(f) provides that judicial notice may be
32. Id. at 793.
33. 855 S.W.2d at 151.
34. Id.; see also Jones v. Colley, 820 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ
denied) (party allowed to play edited videotape of deposition, provided opposing party allowed
to show balance of deposition immediately following the edited demonstration).
35. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 201(b).
36. Butts Retail, Inc. v. Diversifoods, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1992, writ denied).
37. Levit v. Adams, 841 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 850 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1993).
38. Id. at 485.
39. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin, 844 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied).
40. Hartley v. Coker, 843 S.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
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taken at any stage of the proceeding. 4 ' In Dunn v. City of Tyler 42 the East-
land Court of Appeals took judicial notice of a 1988 Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices that was not presented to the trial court by appel-
lants as part of their summary judgment proof below. The Eastland court
took judicial notice of the "certification" page of the manual because it is a
portion of a document promulgated by the State Highway & Public Trans-
portation Commission. 43
Section 38.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a
court to take judicial notice of an amount representative of typical attorney's
fees in a matter before the court.44 In Budd v. Gay 4 5 the court of appeals
found that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to award at-
torney's fees to a plaintiff who prevailed in her action for breach of a written
residential earnest money contract, even though the plaintiff's counsel could
only testify as to the facts of his representation and not as an expert witness.
The court of appeals explained that the trial court took judicial notice of the
usual and customary fee in Harris County, and determined that a fee of
$13,000 was appropriate. 46 Because defendants presented no evidence to
contradict the presumption that the fees were reasonable, 47 the trial court
abused its discretion to deny attorney's fees entirely. 48
Appellate courts presume that a trial court awarding attorney's fees took
judicial notice of the usual and customary attorney's fees.49 In General Elec-
tric Supply Co. v. Gulf Electroquip, Inc. 50 the Houston [I st Dist.] Court of
Appeals held that cases dealing with the fixing of attorney's fees by the trial
judge when acting as a trier of fact have no application to a summary judg-
ment. Where the amount of attorney's fees is not conclusively established,
summary judgment is improper."'
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 202 governs judicial notice of the laws of
other states. In a widow's suit to recommence payments of workers' com-
pensation benefits suspended upon her alleged remarriage, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the statutory law of the state of
Kentucky to rule that nothing in the statute indicated that a common law
marriage terminated the benefits at issue. 52 In another case, an asbestos
manufacturer was held to have waived its claim that Alabama law should
apply to claims where asbestos-related injuries occurred in Alabama because
41. TEX. R. Civ. EvJD. 201(0.
42. 848 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, no writ).
43. Id. at 307 n.3 (manual promulgated pursuant to the provisions of TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. 6701(d) § 29 (Vernon 1977)).
44. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 1986).
45. 846 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
46. Id. at 524.
47. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.003 (Vernon 1986).
48. 846 S.W.2d at 524.
49. See, e.g., Ross v. 3D Tower Ltd., 824 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
50. 857 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
51. Id. at 601-02.
52. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Borum, 834 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied).
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it failed to request that the trial court apply Alabama law.5 3
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 203 permits a Texas court to judicially no-
tice law of a foreign country.5 4 The rule permits a trial court determining
the law of a foreign nation to "consider any material or source, whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under the rules of evidence, including
but not limited to affidavits, testimony, briefs, and treatises." 55 In Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Baker5 6 the Texarkana Court of Appeals pre-
sumed that the trial court determining Canadian law considered an affidavit
previously filed in the action and considered argument of counsel regarding
Canadian law in a plea to the jurisdiction. Rule 203 requires the trial court
considering other sources of foreign law to give the parties notice and an
opportunity to comment on the sources and to submit further material to the
court.5 7 Even though the record did not reflect that the trial court gave the
parties such notice or opportunity, the court of appeals held that the failure
did not appear to have been such as was reasonably calculated to cause a
rendition of an improper judgment, and that even if comment on the court's
sources had been allowed, it is not likely that the court's decision would have
been different.58
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 204 permits a court to take judicial notice of
the ordinances of municipalities and counties of Texas, the contents of the
Texas Register, and of the codified rules of the agencies published in the
Administrative Code.59 One court during the Survey period declined to take
judicial notice of a municipal ordinance because it was not submitted in veri-
fied form. 6°
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses presumptions. Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence lack a corresponding Article III,
Texas common law continues to govern the law of presumptions. During
the Survey period, Texas appellate courts continued to further develop the
law of presumptions, burden of proof, and inferences.
In City of Seven Points v. Anderson,61 an appeal from a judgment that
directed an election on a disincorporation petition, the Tyler Court of Ap-
peals held that "[u]nencumbered by a presumption that the mayor's count
53. Keene Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied); cf.
Keene Corp. v. Rogers, 863 S.W.2d 168, 174-76 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ requested)
(applying Alabama law in case regarding asbestos-related inquiries although plaintiff failed to
request judicial notice of Alabama law, since manufacturer failed to object to use of Alabama
law).
54, TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 203.
55. Id.
56. 838 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
57, TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 203.
58. 838 S.W.2d at 841.
59. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 204.
60. City of Houston v. Southwest Concrete Constr., Inc., 835 S.W.2d 728, 733 n.5 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (citing Metro Fuels, Inc. v. City of Austin, 827
S.W.2d 531, 532 & n.3 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ)).
61. 834 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
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was accurate, the petitioners had to show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that at least two-thirds of the qualified voters had signed the petition
[at issue]; this is precisely the burden of proof that the petitioners met."'62 In
Flores v. Texas Department of Health,63 an action challenging a permit for
expansion of a county's solid waste disposal site, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals held that the health department's admission that it acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in setting a ground water table under a landfill created a
strong presumption that was not contradicted by the record in the proceed-
ing for a solid waste disposal permit.64
An inference is a conclusion that the jury may reasonably draw from
proven facts.65 During the Survey period, two courts held that an inference
may not be stacked upon an inference. 66 One court of appeals reiterated the
principle that on motion for summary judgment, evidence supportive of the
nonmovant will be presumed as true, with all reasonable inferences indulged
in the nonmovant's favor and any doubts resolved to its advantage. 67
IV. ARTICLE IV - RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Article IV of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs relevancy and its
limits. Rule 401 defines relevance. 68 Rule 402 provides that all relevant evi-
dence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, or
other rules.69 Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. 70 During the
Survey period, several Texas appellate courts used the definition of relevance
contained in Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 401 as a basis for admitting7' and
excluding evidence. 72 Several courts used Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 402
62. Id. at 520.
63. 835 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
64. Id. at 811.
65. Page v. Lockley, 176 S.W.2d 991 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 142 Tex. 594, 180 S.W.2d 616 (1944).
66. Caller-Times Publishing Co., Inc. v. Triad Communications, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 18, 24
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) ("A trier of fact may not stack an inference upon
an inference."); Ice Bros. Inc. v. Bannowsky, 840 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no
writ) ("An inference does not constitute evidence in support of a proposition unless the infer-
ence is based upon facts established by direct evidence .... an inference cannot be drawn from
facts established by another inference; i.e. an inference based on an inference.").
67. Ice Bros., Inc., 840 S.W.2d at 62.
68. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 401.
69. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 402. For the definition of relevance, see TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 401.
70. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 402.
71. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 854 S.W.2d at 248 (photographs and accounting evidence);
Bexar County Appraisal Review Bd. v. First Baptist Church, 846 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied) (door opened to admission of charitable works of cor-
porate party); AV.I., Inc. v. Heathington, 842 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ
denied) (testimony of representatives' representations to third parties to prove representative
engaged in deceptive trade practices to plaintiff); Collum v. City of Abilene, 840 S.W.2d 1
(Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied) (evidence that firefighters received extra pay for certi-
fication as intermediate or advanced firefighters was relevant and admissible in an action by
firemen to recover overtime pay).
72. Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d at 816 (collateral matter to prove char-
acter in an effort to show action and conformity therewith); Keene Corp., 837 S.W.2d at 224
(impeachment of expert regarding his research on beryllium irrelevant and collateral to his
testimony regarding knowledge and awareness of asbestos-related disease); Travelers Cos. v.
1994]
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to admit73 and exclude74 certain evidence,
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence
on special grounds such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or if the
evidence is merely cumulative.75 The exclusion under Rule 403 is discre-
tionary. 76 During the Survey period, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held
that the probative value of a urinalysis result showing the decedent was posi-
tive for marijuana outweighed its prejudicial effect in a wrongful death ac-
tion arising from an automobile collision. 77 The court explained that the
evidence was offered on the intoxication issue and as an explanation for why
decedent's vehicle had crossed the center line causing the collision. 78
In a railroad employee's suit against the railroad seeking damages for per-
sonal injuries, once the railroad offered evidence that it was mandatory that
the plaintiff-worker be tested by a certified vocational evaluator and that no
job offer would ever be made to him because he was not so tested, the injured
worker was not precluded under Rule 403 from offering rebuttal testimony
by another injured worker that the railroad had offered him a job, that he
had not been tested by the evaluator, and that he had in fact been tested by
the same doctor who tested plaintiff.79 The Eastland Court of Appeals ex-
plained that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence.80 The court further explained that the rail-
Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708, 714 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ) (statement of amount of
uninsured loss of computer equipment valued at $8,060 was not relevant to inventory of fire
loss of $179,000).
73. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 854 S.W.2d at 248; Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 SW.2d 833, 847
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (testimony by client's co-defendant in
IRS collection action regarding circumstances of meeting with the attorney and circumstances
of client's filling out IRS form was relevant in legal malpractice suit brought against attorney);
Bexar County Appraisal Review Bd., 846 S.W.2d at 562 (door opened to admission of charita-
ble works of corporate party); Carter v. Exxon Corp., 842 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1992, writ denied) (in lessor's action against oil and gas lessee alleging lessee failed to pay
correct amount of gas royalties, evidence concerning oil royalties paid was relevant after lessor
"opened the door" by introducing such evidence); L.S.R. Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart,
837 S.W.2d 693 ((Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (trial court erred in excluding evi-
dence of the dollar amount of tax benefits purchaser received from the purchase in a DTPA
case).
74. Carter v. Exxon Corp., 842 S.W.2d at 393 (in lessor's action against oil and gas lessee
alleging lessee failed to pay correct amount of gas royalties, evidence concerning oil royalties
paid was relevant after lessor "opened the door" by introducing such evidence); James v. Texas
Dep't of Human Servs., 836 S.W.2d 236, 243 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ) (state-
ments of children were not relevant to any issue in a case in an action to terminate parental
rights); Travelers Cos., 838 S.W.2d at 714 (statement of amount of uninsured loss of computer
equipment valued at $8,060 was not relevant to inventory of fire loss of $179,000).
75. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 403.
76. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if .... " Id. (emphasis added).
77. Nichols v. Howard Trucking Co., Inc., 839 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992,
no writ).
78. Id. at 158.
79. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Roberts, 849 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, writ
denied).
80. Id. at 370.
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road had invited the rebuttal testimony.8 1
L.S.R. Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart8 2 involved a purchaser's action
against vendors alleging fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations.
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence of the dollar amount that the purchaser received in tax
benefits from the real estate transaction, which had been offered for purposes
of vendors' ratification and waiver defenses.8 3 The court explained that the
evidence indicated that the purchaser knew about the fraud at the time of
the alleged ratification and waiver, that the purchaser held the property for
one and one half years after becoming aware of the alleged fraud without
filing a cause of action, that an actual dollar amount of the tax benefits was
required to be admitted to fully show the relevance of the benefit, and that
the purchaser had actually received $550,000 in tax benefits would tend to
establish that the purchaser intentionally chose to ratify the transaction to
capitalize on his tax consequences.8 4
In Carter v. Exxon Corp.85 the Eastland Court of Appeals held that
although evidence of the wealth of a litigant would ordinarily be inadmissi-
ble, once the door was opened by one party's introduction of such evidence,
the other party's rebuttal with similar evidence was not unfairly prejudicial
because it tended to offset the prejudice caused by the initial introduction of
such evidence.8 6
Several courts during the Survey period held that the probative value of
certain evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice or confusion of the issues. In a workers' compensation case, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the probative value of evidence that the worker
had made previous claim for workers' compensation and that on subsequent
employment applications he had stated that he was free of any defects or
disabilities was substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, and misleading of the jury where none of the other
injuries involved the claimant's left shoulder, for which present compensa-
tion was being sought.8 7 In a mother's appeal from a judgment that the
putative father was not the child's father, the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to exclude under
Rule 403 a prior judgment that disestablished the mother's husband as the
child's biological father.88
With few exceptions, character is not admissible to prove conduct on a
particular occasion. 89 For example, in a workers' compensation action, a
claimant's job application in which he falsely answered "no" to the question
81. Id.
82. 837 S.W.2d at 693.
83. Id. at 699-700.
84. Id. at 699-701.
85. 842 S.W.2d at 393.
86. Id. at 400.
87. Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d at 816.
88. Silva v. Enz, 853 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
89. TEX. R. Cv. EVID. 404.
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of whether he had ever been injured on the job was not admissible because
the job application raised a collateral matter to prove the claimant's charac-
ter in an effort to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 90 Another
court of appeals held that although evidence of charitable activity of a corpo-
rate party to a lawsuit would normally be excluded under Rules 404 and
405, such testimony was admissible where one party "opened the door."91
Prior acts or transactions by one of the parties with other persons, com-
monly referred to as res inter alios acta, are irrelevant. 92 In Missouri Pacific
R.R. Co. v. Roberts93 the Eastland Court of Appeals held that the general
rule of res inter alios acta, which holds that prior acts or transactions by one
of the parties with other persons are irrelevant, no longer exists independent
of the evidentiary rules governing relevance and other acts.94
Although character evidence is not admissible to prove conduct on a par-
ticular occasion, 95 evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice
of an organization is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or
routine practice. During the Survey period, one court properly held that
evidence of a single instance of misconduct does not rise to the level of
"habit" as contemplated by Rule 406.96 Similarly, evidence of a police of-
ficer's past driving record and the police department's assessment of that
record was not admissible in an automobile negligence case as evidence of
habit where the officer had suffered only three low-speed accidents in a six-
year period.97 In A. V.L, Inc. v. Heathington,98 a deceptive trade practices
action by farmers against a leasing company alleging that the leasing repre-
sentative made a misrepresentation concerning the purchase of irrigation
systems at the end of the lease, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the
testimony of other farmers concerning similar representations made to them
to establish that the representation was made to plaintiff, under rubric of
"habit" evidence.99 Although this evidence appears to have been excludable
under Rule 404(b), it appears that no such objection was made. 00 In Kava-
naugh v. Perkins,'0' a mandamus proceeding arising out of a medical mal-
practice action seeking punitive damages and alleging that the physician
performed surgery in an impaired state, a physician sought a writ of manda-
90. Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d at 823.
91. Bexar County Appraisal Review Bd., 846 S.W.2d at 554.
92. Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, Inc., 747 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App-Corpus
Christi 1988, writ denied); Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 596 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ re'd n.r.e.).
93. 849 S.W.2d at 367.
94. Id. at 369-70 (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 401, 402, 403, and 404(b)).
95. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 404.
96. Borden, Inc. v. Rios, 850 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993),judgment set
aside by agreement, 859 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1993).
97. Waldon v. City of Longview, 855 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, no writ).
98. 842 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
99. Id. at 715-16.
100. "AV.I. fails to cite any rule that would render the questioned testimony inadmissi-
ble." Id. at 716.
101. 838 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
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mus directing the trial court to set aside a discovery order because it re-
quired the physician to produce documents and information regarding his
alcohol and substance abuse. In denying the writ of mandamus, the Dallas
Court of Appeals explained that a defendant's routine use of drugs is rele-
vant to the context of his actions in question and thus is relevant to punitive
damages. ' 0 2
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 407(a) provides that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct
in connection with the event at issue.' 0 3 In Pennington v. Brock,'14 a medi-
cal malpractice action, evidence that the hospital subsequently remedied the
alleged deficiencies was not admissible to prove negligence in a suit by a
patient whose postoperative infection was allegedly due to unsanitary hospi-
tal conditions. In Keetch v. Kroger Co.,105 a patron's action against a gro-
cery store for injuries sustained when she allegedly slipped and fell in an
accumulation of plant spray in the floral department, the Dallas Court of
Appeals held that evidence of the supervisor's post-accident instruction to an
employee to be more careful was properly excluded as a basis for impeach-
ment. 0 6 In Chapa v. Garcia,10 7 a mandamus proceeding arising out of a suit
against a rifle manufacturer seeking to discover documents containing alter-
native design information, Justice Doggett in a concurring opinion wrote
that the documents were generated after the rifle at issue was manufactured
"precludes neither their discoverability nor admissibility at trial."' 08
Texas Rule of Evidence 408 excludes evidence of compromise and offers
to compromise when offered to prove liability or the invalidity of a claim or
its amount. 0 9 In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Millard,10 a manda-
mus proceeding, the Houston [lst Dist.] Court of Appeals found that a trial
judge had abused his discretion in refusing to sever an uninsured motorist
case from a bad faith case, where the bad faith claims were based on the
alleged inadequacy of the insurer's settlement offer."' Following the rea-
soning of another court of appeals in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Wilborn," 12 the Millard court explained that when an uninsured
motorist case is combined with a bad faith case, a trial court has two com-
peting interests: either it refuses to admit evidence of settlement offer, hon-
oring defendant's right under Rule 408 but denying plaintiff the right to use
it to establish essential elements of a bad faith claim, or the trial court admits
the evidence of settlement offer, and permits plaintiff to satisfy its proof re-
102. Id. at 619.
103. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 407(a).
104. 841 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
105. 845 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), aff'd, 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992).
106. Id. at 282.
107. 848 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
108. Id. at 671-72 n.6 (Doggett, J., concurring).
109. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 408.
110. 847 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
111. Id. at 672-73.
112. 835 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
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quirements but denies defendant's right to exclude such evidence. 1 3 The
Millard court agreed with the Wilborn court and held that the resolution of
this conflict requires severing of the two causes of action and abating the bad
faith claim until final disposition of the uninsured motorist claim.' 14
Rule 408 excludes evidence of compromise and offers to compromise
when offered to prove liability or the invalidity of a claim or its amount. The
rule does not, however, require exclusion of such evidence when offered for
another purpose. 1 5 An example of such a purpose occurred in Gilbert v.
Pettiette, 16 in which the court of appeals affirmed the admission of a settle-
ment where appellee filed a counterclaim alleging that appellant had
breached a contract to settle." 17
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 411 provides that evidence of liability insur-
ance is not admissible regarding the issue of the insured's negligence or other
wrongful acts."i 8 In Hall v. Martin119 a negligence and gross negligence ac-
tion by a minor and her next friend against her parents, the Beaumont Court
of Appeals held that evidence that the minor's mother had liability insurance
was not relevant to the issue of whether she acted negligently in connection
with her minor daughter's motorcycle accident and that insurance could not
create a legal duty or "vitiate the parental immunity doctrine.' 120
V. ARTICLE V - PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs privileges. No
person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter 12 1 unless rules of evi-
dence recognize the privilege,122 or a statute123 or constitution 24 grants the
privilege. Some of the specific privileges provided for in the Texas Rules of
Civil Evidence include: (1) lawyer-client privilege,125 (2) husband-wife com-
munication privilege, 126 (3) communications to clergymen, 127 (4) trade
secrets, 128 and (5) physician-patient privilege. 129
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503 codifies the common law lawyer-client
privilege. With few exceptions, attorney-client communications are pro-
113. 847 S.W.2d at 673.
114. Id. at 673 (citing Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d at 262).
115. TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 408.
116. 838 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
117. Id. at 892.
118. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 411.
119. 851 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
120. Id. at 910.
121. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 501(2).
122. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 502-10.
123. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h, repealed by TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 509-10 as
to civil cases and TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 509-10 as to criminal cases (confidential communica-
tions between physician and patient relating to professional services rendered by a physician
privilege).
124. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
125. TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 503.
126. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 504.
127. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 505.
128. TEX. R. Ov. EvID. 507.
129. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 509.
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tected from discovery by Rule 503.130 One court during the Survey period
held that the attorney-client privilege applies only in connection with rendi-
tion of legal services, and communications for other purposes are not pro-
tected merely because one of the parties is licensed to practice law.131
In Turner v. Montgomery, 32 a mandamus proceeding arising out of a di-
vorce case, a wife sought discovery of documents regarding the value of her
husband's law partnership. The court of appeals held that denial of the
wife's discovery was not justified where at least twelve of the fourteen re-
quests did not seek privileged communications between an attorney and cli-
ent relating to her husband's law practice. 133 The court further held that the
husband waived his objection to the request by failing to request an inspec-
tion by the trial court or present evidence supporting his claim of attorney-
client privilege.' 34 For these reasons, the court of appeals held that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying discovery.' 3 5
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503 provides that a client has a privilege to
refuse to disclose confidential communications made for the purpose of facil-
itating the rendition of professional legal services to the client. 136 Rule 503
covers not only communications between the client and the lawyer, but also
extends to representatives of the client. Rule 503(a)(2) defines a representa-
tive of the client as one "having authority to obtain professional legal serv-
ices, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the
client."' 137 The Texas Supreme Court recently considered who is a "repre-
sentative of the client" in National Tank Co. v. Brotherton.13  Brotherton
was a mandamus proceeding arising out of a lawsuit brought by the wife of a
deceased, individually and on behalf of her children and the estate, arising
out of a plant explosion that killed one worker and injured others. 39 At
issue in Brotherton was whether accident reports and witness statements
were privileged from discovery.14° The Texas Supreme Court held that
communications between employees of the manufacturing plant as witnesses
to the accident and representatives of the corporate owner's legal depart-
ment were not protected by the attorney-client privilege because the em-
ployee witnesses were not authorized to seek legal counsel on behalf of the
corporation, as required under Rule 503(a)(2) for purposes of asserting the
lawyer-client privilege. 4 The Texas Supreme Court held that Rule
503(a)(2) "clearly adopts the control group test"' 42 even though the United
130. Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 S.W.2d at 846.
131. Thacker v. State, 852 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
132. 836 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
133. Id. at 850-51.
134. Id. at 851.
135. Id.
136. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503(b).
137. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503(a)(2).
138. 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 195.
141. Id. at 197.
142. 851 S.W.2d at 198. Under the "control group" test, previously recognized by many
federal courts, a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements
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States Supreme Court rejected the "control group" test.' 43 Rejecting appel-
lant's argument that a lower echelon employee may be a representative of
the corporation if the employee speaks with the "blessing" of corporate man-
agement, the Texas Supreme Court explained that this "subject matter test"
was clearly available to but not selected by the drafters of the Texas rules. 144
The Texas Supreme Court held that witness statements taken by the em-
ployer's liability insurer for the employer's corporate counsel were not pro-
tected from disclosure by the lawyer-client privilege, because even if the
insurer was a representative of the lawyer under Rule 503(a)(4), there was
no evidence that the witnesses who made the statements were representatives
of the client under 503(a)(2). 145 Finding no abuse of discretion, 146 the Texas
Supreme Court denied the writ.
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503(a)(4) defines "representative of the law-
yer."' 147 A representative of a lawyer is "one employed by the lawyer to
assist the lawyer in rendition of professional legal services," or "an account-
ant who is reasonably necessary for the lawyer's rendition of professional
legal services."' 48 In LMC. Fertilizer v. O'Neill,149 a mandamus proceeding,
the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that the attorney-client priv-
ilege protected from discovery testimony of investigators hired by a plan
operator for off-site investigation concerning an explosion at the plant, where
counsel for the plant operator established by affidavit that the investigators
were hired at his request to assist in his representation of the plant operator,
and that at no time had the information gathered by the investigators been
disseminated to any third parties.150
In Keene Corp. v. Caldwell '1' a mandamus proceeding arising out of two
asbestos personal injury actions, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals
held that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work-product exemp-
tion requires that the privileged communication or work product contain an
attorney's mental impressions, legal advice, or opinions in order to retain
their privileged nature. 152 The court explained that the subject matter of the
information communicated between the attorney and client and of the work
product generated by an attorney is of no concern in determining whether
made by employees in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney. "Courts
applying this test generally protect only statements made by the upper echelon of corporate
management .... The control group test reflects the distinction between the corporate entity
and the individual employee and is based on the premise that only an employee who controls
the actions of the corporation can personify the corporation." Id. at 197.
143. The United States Supreme Court rejected the control group test in Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
144. 851 S.W.2d at 198.
145. Id. at 198-99.
146. Id. at 200.
147. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503(a)(4).
148. Id.
149. 846 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
150. Id. at 592.
151. 840 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
152. Id. at 719.
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the privilege or exemption is applicable to documents. 53 The court held that
the trial court erred in determining privilege based on the contents of the
documents rather than their nature as communications between an attorney
and a client under Rule 503(b) 154 and work product under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 166(b)(3)(a). 155 The court further explained that if a docu-
ment is privileged or exempted from discovery under the rules, that certain
information within the documents may be discoverable through other means
does not overcome the privilege or exemption.' 56 In another mandamus
case with the same trial judge as respondent, the same court of appeals held
that the attorney-client privilege is not limited to communications that con-
stitute legal advice or opinion, and that it attaches not only to legal advice
but also to communications between the client and the counsel, including
factual information communicated. 57
In Republic Insurance Co. v. Davis' 58 the Texas Supreme Court held that
the "offensive use" doctrine of waiver of privilege, enunciated by the Texas
Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals,159 applies to the attor-
ney-client privilege, although it did not apply in the case at bar.' 60 The
supreme court listed three factors that should guide the trial court in deter-
mining whether a waiver has occurred: (1) the party asserting the privilege
must seek affirmative relief; (2) the privileged information sought must be
such that, if believed by the fact finder, in all probability would be outcome
determinative of the cause of action asserted, and that mere relevance is in-
sufficient; and (3) disclosure of the confidential communication must be the
only means by which the agreed party can obtain the evidence.1 61 The
supreme court explained that if any one of these requirements is lacking, the
trial court must uphold the privilege. 162 The Texas Supreme Court ex-
plained that here, waiver had not occurred because the underlying declara-
tory judgment action out of which the mandamus case arose was not an
action seeking affirmative relief.163
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503(d)(1) provides an exception to the law-
yer-client privilege if the services of a lawyer were sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or
reasonably should have known to be a crime or a fraud. 64 In Granada
Corp. v. First Court of Appeals165 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
crime-fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege applied to documents




157. GAF Corp. v. Caldwell, 839 S.W.2d 149,151 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
orig. proceeding).
158. 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1993).
159. 686 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding).
160. 856 S.W.2d at 163.
161. Id. at 163.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 164.
164. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503(d)(1).
165. 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
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discovered by a stockholder in an action against the corporation, where
other documents suggested that the corporation fraudulently misled the
stockholders to give up their stock in exchange for royalty certificates, while
the corporation was seeking legal advice regarding proposals that would nul-
lify the value of their certificates. 66 Explaining that the crime-fraud excep-
tion applies only if a prima facie case is made of contemplated fraud, the
supreme court held that sufficient proof had been offered to establish a prima
facie case of fraud. 167
Citing Granada for the proposition that a party who asserts the crime-
fraud exception must first establish a prima facie case showing a violation
sufficiently serious to defeat the privilege, and the proposition that there
must be a relationship between the document for which the privilege is chal-
lenged and the prima facie proof offered, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of
Appeals in Arkla, Inc. v. Harris168 held that the crime fraud exception did
not apply where there was no showing that the services of the attorneys who
prepared title opinions and related documents were sought or obtained with
any fraudulent or illegal intent. 69 Similarly, where there was no evidence
that a defendant corporation sought a lawyer's advice to commit fraud, the
crime-fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege was held not to be appli-
cable.170 The party claiming the crime-fraud exception has the burden of
establishing the prima facie case, which requirement is met when the propo-
nent offers evidence establishing elements of fraud and that the fraud was
ongoing or about to be committed when the document was prepared.17'
That the plaintiff's cause of action involved fraudulent conduct is insufficient
to establish a prima facie case.' 72 Another court of appeals, finding that
such a prima facie showing had been made, held that the trial court abused
its discretion by granting a protective order in its entirety without first con-
ducting an in camera inspection to determine whether the communications
are privileged or come within the exception.' 73
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503(d)(5) provides that in litigation between
commonly represented clients, the lawyer-client privilege does not attach to
matters that are of mutual interest between or among any of the clients.' 74
In Scrivner v. Hobson 75 a mandamus proceeding arising out of a legal mal-
practice case against an attorney who represented joint clients in an environ-
mental lawsuit, and who allegedly settled the lawsuit without the clients'
166. Id. at 227.
167. Id.
168. 846 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
169, Id. at 630.
170, Cigna Corp. v. Spears, 838 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, orig.
proceeding).
171. Id. at 569.
172. Id. The court reiterated that a court may look to the documents themselves to deter-
mine whether a prima facie case has been established (citing Freeman v. Bianchi, 820 S.W.2d
853, 861 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding [leave granted]).
173. Volcanic Gardens Management Co., Inc. v. Paxson, 847 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1993, orig. proceeding).
174. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 503(d)(5).
175. 854 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
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authority, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals found that the joint
clients exception to the attorney-client privilege and attorney-work-product
privilege applied to portions of the attorney's file, including information re-
garding the actual basis for the calculations of the amount due each client on
behalf of whom the attorney settled the lawsuit. 176 The court also held that
because the contents of the documents were relevant to the plaintiffs' claims
that the proceeds of the aggregate settlement were improperly and fraudu-
lently distributed among the various plaintiffs in the environmental lawsuit,
the joint clients exception to the attorney-client or attorney-work-product
privilege regarding breach of duty by a lawyer also permitted discovery of
the documents. 77
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 507 privileges trade secrets. ' 78 A person has
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent others from disclosing trade
secrets if allowing the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise
work injustice.' 79 The protection of Rule 507 is qualified and not
absolute. ' 80
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 509 governs the physician/patient privilege.
In Kavanaugh v. Perkins181 a physician sought a writ of mandamus directing
the trial court to set aside a discovery order that required the physician to
produce documents and information regarding his alcohol and substance
abuse, his mental, physical, and emotional condition, and information pro-
vided or gathered by the medical review committees of the State Board of
Medical Examiners. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the physician
failed to prove that the authorization was overly broad on its face because he
failed to provide the appellate court with a copy of the authorization. 82 The
court also held that the physician failed to establish that the information
about him was privileged because he did not make any attempt to prove
whether the allegedly privileged information was contained in a record pre-
pared by a medical review committee or the State Board of Medical Examin-
ers.183 Finally, the court held that the physician waived his claim of
privilege by failing to specifically plead privilege in response to the discovery
requests seeking the documents. ' 84
Both Rule 509, governing the physician/patient privilege, and Rule 510,
governing confidentiality of mental health information, contain exceptions to
the privileges in proceedings by the patient against a physician or health care
professional where the disclosure is relevant to the claim or defense of the
physician or professional.18 5 In R.K v. Ramirez, 186 a mandamus proceeding
176. Id. at 152.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. TEX. R. Ov. EvID. 507.
180. Chapa v. Garcia, 848 S.W.2d at 670-71.
181. 838 S.W.2d at 616.
182. Id. at 620-21.
183. Id. at 622. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(c) (Vernon 1992).
184. Id. at 620.
185. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 509(d)(1); TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 510(d)(1).
186. 855 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
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arising out of a medical malpractice action, the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the doctor's
medical records produced absent any pleading showing that the plaintiffs
were placing the doctor's medical condition in issue. 187
Rules 509 and 510 also provide exceptions to the privileges in any suit
affecting the parent-child relationship. 188 These exceptions apply to medical
and mental health records of both parties and nonparties. 89 In Smith v.
Gayle'90 the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that based on its in
camera inspection, it was unable to hold that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion when it ruled that medical records of a mother's close friend were
irrelevant to issues in the underlying child custody proceeding in which he
was not a party, thus making the exception that the physician/patient privi-
lege and mental health information privilege for disclosure inapplicable.' 9'
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 511 provides that a privilege is waived if the
holder or his predecessor voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of
any significant part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is
privileged. 19 2 In Arkla, Inc. v. Harris'93 a mandamus proceeding seeking to
compel the trial court to set aside its order compelling production of docu-
ments, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that "[o]nce a prima
facie case of privilege [was] established, and the documents [were] tendered
to the trial court," the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct
an in camera inspection.' 94 The appellate court explained that the trial
court could not have made a proper determination that the privilege had
been waived without reviewing the tendered documents. 9 5 In Granada
Corp. v. First Court of Appeals' 96 a mandamus proceeding, the Texas
Supreme Court held that a corporation had waived the attorney-client privi-
lege by inadvertently producing the documents pursuant to a document pro-
duction in which 150,000 pages of documents were produced for inspection
by the opposing party. 197 The corporation argued that inadvertent produc-
tion of necessity was involuntary, but the Texas Supreme Court disagreed. 198
The Texas Supreme Court held that "[i]nadvertent production is distinguish-
able from involuntary production," and that "[a] party who permits access
to unscreened documents may, due to inattention unwittingly, but nonethe-
less voluntarily, disclose a privileged document."' 199 The supreme court ex-
plained that "[w]hen deciding the issue of voluntariness, a court should
187. Id. at 207.
188. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 509(d)(6); TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 510(d)(6).
189. Cheatham v. Rogers, 824 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, orig. proceeding).
190. 834 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
191. Id. at 107.
192. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 511.
193. 846 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
194. Id. at 631.
195. Id.
196. 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1992).





evaluate all circumstances of the disclosure. ' '200 The supreme court found it
relevant that here the corporation "did not avail itself of opportunities to
prevent disclosure of the memoranda, although it had many." 20 1 Noting
that Granada did not segregate out the documents in its initial review, did
not detect the documents when the opposing party notified Granada of its
designations for photocopying or when the copies were sent to the opposing
party, and did not inventory the documents at various points before produc-
tion, the supreme court explained that "Granada's conclusory assertion that
the disclosure was inadvertent and therefore involuntary offer[ed] no cir-
cumstantial justification for the disclosure. ' 20 2 Therefore, the supreme
court held that Granada "failed to sustain its burden of establishing that its
disclosure of the documents was involuntary. '20 3
VI. ARTICLE VI - WITNESSES
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 601 governs competency and incompetency
of witnesses. 2°4 "Every person is competent to be a witness except as other-
wise provided in [the] rules. ' 20 5 Although 601 provides that insane per-
sons20 6 and children 207 are incompetent to testify in any proceeding subject
to the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence, the rules do not provide that convicted
felons are incompetent witnesses. In Parrish v. Brooks20 8 the Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that the affidavit of a doctor who had been convicted
of a felony was not rendered incompetent by his conviction.209 Explaining
that it found "no authority holding that a convicted felon cannot be a com-
petent witness,"' 210 the court explained that the affidavit was prepared before
the conviction, and although the conviction might impair the credibility of
the witness, it did not render the affidavit incompetent. 211
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 602 provides that a witness may not testify
to a matter unless he has personal knowledge of the matter.212 During the
Survey period, one court held that "a litigant's lack of personal knowledge of
a fact does not conclusively negate the existence of the fact."'213
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 608 governs evidence that may be intro-




204. TEX. R. Cv. EVID. 601.
205. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 601(a).
206. TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 601(a)(1).
207. TEX. R. Cv. EVID. 601(a)(2).
208. 856 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
209. Id. at 528.
210. Id. The court noted that until its repeal in 1985, a Texas statute had specifically
provided that a convicted felon could be a competent witness. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 3717, repealed by Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 9(1), 1985
Tex. Gen. Laws 3322).
211. 856 S.W.2d at 528.
212. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 602.
213. Rampel v. Wascher, 845 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ de-
nied) (citing Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990,
writ denied)) (husband's testimony at his deposition that he was "not aware of anything" that
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duced concerning the character and conduct of witnesses.214 In Service
Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Martin215 a workers' compensation case, the Dallas
Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court erred in excluding
plaintiff's 1981 job application in which he falsely answered "no" to the
question of whether he had ever been injured on the job. The Dallas Court
of Appeals explained that the impeachment method at issue was governed by
Rule 608, which "explicitly prohibits impeaching a witness's testimony by
inquiring about specific acts of the witness other than criminal convictions as
provided by rule 609."'216 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the job
application was not admissible as direct evidence under Rule 404(b), nor as
impeachment evidence under Rules 608(a) and (b).2 17
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 609 defines the circumstances under which a
witness's credibility can be attacked with evidence that he has been con-
victed of a crime.218 Before admitting the conviction into evidence, the trial
court must determine that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
prejudicial effect to the person against whom the evidence is offered. 219 In
Borden, Inc. v. Rios 220 a former salesman's suit for defamation against his
supervisor who accused him of being a thief, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals held that the trial court committed no error by permitting defend-
ants to impeach the salesperson with his conviction of a misdemeanor "hot
check" offense three and a half years prior to trial. 221
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 611 controls the mode and order of interro-
gation and presentation of evidence. 222 The decision to allow witnesses to
testify out of order is ordinarily a matter within the discretion of the trial
court.223 One court of appeals during the Survey period, however, held that
a trial court had abused its discretion by permitting plaintiff's expert to tes-
tify about the net worth of Wal-Mart before the plaintiff had shown a prima
facie case of gross negligence.224 The El Paso Court of Appeals noted that
"the trial judge was led into error by the representation of [plaintiff's] coun-
sel that he would prove up a prima facie case of gross negligence," which he
never did. 225
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 611 provides that "[a] witness may be cross-
examined on any manner relevant to any issue in the case, including credibil-
his wife did to cause her own death was not a judicial admission of fact because his lack of
personal knowledge did not conclusively negate the existence of the fact).
214. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 608.
215. 855 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
216. Id. at 823 (citing TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 608(b)).
217. Id.
218. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 609.
219. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 609(a).
220. 850 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), judgment set aside by settlement, 859
S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1993).
221. Id. at 834.
222. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 611.
223. See TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 611(a).





ity.' ' 22 6 One court during the Survey period held that in cases in which both
parties designate the same expert witness, the trial court should permit the
other side to cross-examine the witness about those subjects on which the
witness was designated, regardless of whether the witness testified to them
on direct examination.227 The court noted that "[o]nly if the scope of cross-
examination exceeds the designation of the expert's testimony should the
trial court require the cross-examining party to show good cause or risk of
having the scope of the cross-examination limited. '228 The court specifically
rejected appellant's argument that it should limit cross-examination to the
scope of direct examination because a limit "would be in direct contraven-
tion of the long-standing tradition in Texas of unlimited cross-examina-
tion. ' 229 In Palmer v. Miller Brewing Co. 230 a challenge that the trial court
erroneously limited cross-examination was not preserved for appeal because
the party did not obtain an answer to the improperly excluded question.23 1
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 613 governs impeachment and support of
witnesses with prior statements. 232 The proper foundation for admitting a
prior statement to impeach a witness includes establishing where, when, and
to whom the prior statement was made.233 Upon cross-examination, if the
witness admits unequivocally to having made the prior statement, then the
impeachment is complete, and the prior statement is not admissible.234 In
Downen v. Texas Gulf Shrimp Co. ,235 a seaman's personal injury action, the
vessel captain did not unequivocally admit to making prior statements in his
deposition; therefore, portions of his prior statement were admissible to im-
peach his testimony. 236
For the prior inconsistent statement to be admissible, "the witness must be
told the contents of such statement and the time and place and the person to
whom it was made, and must be afforded an opportunity to explain or deny
such statement. ' 237 In Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc. 238 evidence of wit-
nesses' prior inconsistent statements was proper where the witnesses were
"told of their prior statements and were given several opportunities to ex-
plain them." 239 For instance, one witness remembered speaking with an in-
vestigator "but denied specific assertions, stating that he was unable to
remember the substance of his statement even when reminded of it."24° An-
226. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 611(b).




230. 852 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
231. Id. at 67.
232. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 613.
233. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 613(a).
234. Id.
235. 846 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
236. Id. at 513.
237. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 613(a).
238. 853 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).




other witness remembered giving a statement, "but he did not recall the
date, did not with certainty recognize his own voice on tape, and did not
remember making the specific statements reflected by the tape."' 241
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 613(b) permits impeachment of a witness
"by proof of circumstances or statements showing bias or interest on the
part of [the] witness."' 242 In Keetch v. Kroger Co.,243 a patron's suit against a
grocery store for injuries sustained when she allegedly slipped and fell in an
accumulation of plant spray in the floral department, the patron was not
entitled to impeach a store employee by asking her whether the store had
instructed her not to admit that anything that she did might be dangerous to
the customer. The Dallas Court of Appeals explained that the prior state-
ment at issue was not made by the store employee and in no way showed
bias on the part of the store employee. 244
VII. ARTICLE VII - OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES
The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence permit lay witnesses to offer rationally
based opinions to help clarify facts or misunderstandings. 245 The rules have
greatly liberalized the admission of lay witness's opinion testimony. Texas
law has always been liberal, however, in allowing an owner of property to
offer his opinion on the property's value. 246 A property owner can give
opinion testimony regarding the value of his property, even though he would
not qualify as an expert regarding the value of the same property if owned by
someone else. 247 During the Survey period, one Texas court recognized the
admissibility of lay testimony by permitting an automobile owner to testify
what it would cost to rent an automobile while her automobile was being
repaired, reasoning that the testimony concerned the market value of the
ownership of the automobile and was thus admissible. 248 In a taxpayer's suit
for review of an appraisal district's valuation of property, another appellate
court affirmed the admission of the testimony of the property owner about
the market value of his property. 249 Both courts reiterated the well-estab-
lished principle that an owner can testify as to the market value of his prop-
erty as long as the testimony shows that it refers to market value and not
intrinsic value. 250
241. Id.
242. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 613(b).
243. 845 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), aff'd., 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992).
244. 845 S.W.2d at 281-82.
245. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 701.
246. See, e.g., Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (owner of car stolen from parking garage competent to
testify as to car's value).
247. Id. at 588.
248. Star Houston, Inc. v. Kundak, 843 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ).
249. Bailey County Appraisal Dist. v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, no writ).
250. 843 S.W.2d at 298; 848 S.W.2d at 824.
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Opinion testimony by lay witnesses must be more than mere legal conclu-
sions.251 During the Survey period, one court held that "[m]ere legal con-
clusions by a lay witness [did] not prove the existence of a partnership or
joint venture. '252 Another court held that "[a] legal conclusion in an affida-
vit [was] insufficient to raise an issue of fact in response to a motion for
summary judgment. '253
A fact witness cannot testify to matters that will require him or her to give
an expert opinion. 254 During the Survey period, a witness's general descrip-
tion of the effects on a person who inhaled benzaldehyde went beyond the
specific facts of the case and was held to constitute inadmissible expert opin-
ion from a lay fact witness. 255 Another court, however, held that a state
trooper's testimony in a negligence case alleging that a truck driver made an
improper left turn from the highway, cutting off the automobile driver as he
was trying to pass, was improperly excluded as expert testimony.256 The
court explained that a police officer may give lay opinion testimony if the
testimony is "based on his own personal observations and experiences as a
police officer" and disagreed with the trial court "that the trooper's descrip-
tion of the proper method for making a left turn [was] expert testimony. ' 257
One appellate court during the Survey period held that whether a benefici-
ary under a will exerted undue influence on a testator "is a question of ulti-
mate fact for the fact finder" and that lay opinion offered on that subject was
"neither rationally based on [the witness's] perceptions nor ... helpful to a
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of the undue influ-
ence issue."'258 Another court permitted lay opinion testimony about an-
other's state of mind from an employer's physician's assistant, who testified
that the decision to discharge an employee had been influenced by the em-
ployee's settlement of a workers' compensation claim because the assistant
had direct knowledge of the pattern of conduct regarding medical disqualifi-
cation of employees by the physician, even though the physician did not
make the final discharge decision. 259 One member of the Texas Supreme
Court wrote that "it is difficult to conceive of an instance in which lay opin-
ion would be helpful to a determination of outrageousness" of conduct in a
suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress.260
251. See Ben Fitzgerald Realty Co. v. Muller, 846 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993,
writ denied); Hennigan v. I. P. Petroleum Co., 848 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1993).
252. 846 S.W.2d at 121.
253. 848 S.W.2d at 279.
254. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Alvarez, 703 S.W.2d 367, 371 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e).
255. Baylor Medical Plaza Servs. Corp. v. Kidd, 834 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied).
256. Carter v. Steere Tank Lines, 835 S.W.2d 176, 182 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ
denied).
257. Id. at 182.
258. Green v. Earnest, 840 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
259. Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ
denied).
260. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 632 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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B. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702 permits expert opinion testimony from a
witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education."' 26' Several courts during the Survey period considered whether
witnesses were qualified as experts. One court held that a recently licensed
part-time practicing general dentist was properly qualified as a patient's ex-
pert in a dental malpractice action, even though the dentist was not licensed
when the patient received the treatment at issue from the defendant den-
tist.262 Another court held that an out-of-state chiropractor who was not
licensed in Texas could testify as an expert regarding the reasonableness of
an automobile accident plaintiff's chiropractic bill because the chiropractor
qualified as an expert, and his giving testimony did not constitute the prac-
tice of chiropractic medicine for which a Texas license was required.263 An-
other court held that "[n]on-physicians may qualify as medical experts" and
permitted a neuroscience expert to testify in a medical malpractice action as
to the cause of an infant's brain damage, even though the expert was not a
physician. 264 The court explained that the expert was the type of profes-
sional who is "responsible for teaching medical students and medical special-
ists" about neuroscience. 265 Another court held that a pharmacist, who was
not a physician, was not competent to render expert opinion on the proper
standard of care for a physician practicing a medical specialty, despite the
pharmacist's declaration of expertise, where there was no evidence sug-
gesting "that one schooled in pharmacy ... [was] recognized as being on an
equal footing with a board certified orthopedic surgeon in diagnosing and
treating infections associated with surgical implants. ' 266 Furthermore, a po-
lice lieutenant was not qualified to give expert opinion in a wrongful death
action, in which the officer admitted he had no formal training relating to
train-pedestrian collisions or railroad accident reconstruction, but only as to
traffic accidents, and where his opinion was not limited to nontechnical as-
pects of accident reconstruction. 267 A witness who was not a lawyer and not
experienced in the field of interstate commerce on which he opined was held
not to be competent to express expert opinion as to the terms and provisions
of a fibre optics agreement between a railroad and a telephone company or of
the effect of the agreement itself.268 The testimony of a fact witness was not
permitted to go beyond specific facts of a case into the realm of expert opin-
261. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 702.
262. Smith v. O'Neal, 850 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no
writ).
263. Goodwin v. Camp, 852 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
264. Ponder v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 840 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
265. Id.
266. Nail v. Laros, 854 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
267. Lopez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 847 S.W.2d 330, 335 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993,
no writ).




ion.269 Similarly, an attorney for a party who testifies to reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees is an expert witness, not a fact witness, and must be
designated as an expert for his testimony to be admissible.270
Several courts during the Survey period considered the proper subject
matter for expert opinion testimony. One court held that "[n]et worth and
other aspects of the proper amount of punitive damages are technical and
specialized matters," and "[e]xpert testimony may be properly admitted to
assist the jury in determining the proper amount of punitive damages."'271
Another court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admit-
ting the testimony of a purported expert concerning his interpretation and
conclusions based on the results of a penile plethysmograph test, but did not
place any weight upon any evidence regarding the result of the test where
the proponent failed to establish the reliability of the test.272 One court held
that an appraisal of the husband's respiratory care business by the wife's
expert should not have been admitted because it did not exclude good will
and because it concerned husband's personal future earning capacity, rather
than valuation of the husband's business. 273 Another court held that a trial
court erred in overruling an objection to expert opinion testimony as to the
truthfulness of the children from an expert witness concerning sexually
abused children. 274 The court explained that opinions as to the truthfulness
of another are generally not allowed. 275 In a concurring and dissenting
opinion, Justice Hecht wrote that in a suit for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, whether certain conduct was outrageous "involves no 'scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' as to which a witness could
be qualified as an expert 'by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion' " under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702.276
Although the threshold question in a medical malpractice case is the stan-
dard of care, medical experts are no longer required to first state the stan-
dard of care before giving their opinions. 277 While such a failure "may
ultimately go to the weight or value of the expert's testimony to the
factfinder, [it should not go to] its admissibility, or to the qualifications of
the witness to testify. '278 Another court affirmed the granting of summary
judgment to a defendant physician in a medical malpractice case, finding an
269. Baylor Medical Plaza Servs. Corp. v. Kidd, 834 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied).
270. Bailey County Appraisal Dist. v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, no writ).
271. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Lieck, 845 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992,
writ granted).
272. In re A.V., 849 S.W.2d 393, 348 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
273. Smith v. Smith, 836 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1992, no writ).
274. James v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 836 S.W.2d 236, 244 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, no writ).
275. Id.
276. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 632 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).





affidavit that the physician's standard of care conformed to that of the com-
munity sufficient, even though the affidavit did not state what the standards
were.279 Another court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant
hospital in a medical malpractice case where a physician's affidavit did dis-
cuss the standard of care and the conduct of the nursing staff by reviewing
medical records, and expressed opinions about the necessity of a blood trans-
fusion to the plaintiff patient. 280
C. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703 outlines the proper bases of opinion
testimony.281 If experts in the same field as the witness would reasonably
rely on certain data, the data can form the basis of the expert's opinion and
need not be admissible in evidence. 282 In Baylor Medical Plaza Services
Corp. v. Kidd 283 the Texarkana Court of Appeals rejected an argument that
"an expert may not rely on statements of third parties that are not properly
in evidence."' 284 The court explained that Rule 703 "specifically provides
that inadmissible facts or data may be relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion if they are of the type reasonably relied upon by other experts to
make opinions or draw inferences. '285 The Kidd court permitted a doctor to
make an assumption based on the statements of an expert whose testimony
was inadmissible because he was not listed as an expert witness during
discovery. 286
An expert witness formulating a treatment plan and determining special
education and rehabilitation costs for a damage award in a negligence action
properly relied on tuition costs obtained from special schools, where he testi-
fied that he and other experts routinely rely on costs obtained from schools
to prepare treatment plans and to adapt plans to their patients' available
resources.287 In a mother's suit to terminate the father's parental rights due
to the father's alleged sexual abuse of the child, a trial court did not err by
admitting testimony of a certified social worker concerning his interpretation
and conclusions based on results of a penile plethysmograph test adminis-
tered to the father by a Ph.D., where the father did not object prior to the
introduction into evidence of the Ph.D.'s report, the witness held an ad-
vanced degree in science and social work, and the witness testified that he
routinely used results of penile plethysmographs. 288
279. Smith v. Ponton, 855 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
280. Jaime v. St. Joseph Hosp. Found., 853 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, no writ).
281. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 703.
282. Id.
283. 834 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
284. Id. at 76.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. St. Paul Medical Ctr. v. Cecil, 842 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no
writ).
288. In re A.V., 849 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
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D. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 704 provides that "[t]estimony in the form
of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. '28 9 The
Texas Supreme Court has specifically held that it is permissible to admit
expert testimony on mixed questions of law and fact.290 Two courts during
the survey admitted such testimony on mixed questions of law and fact. One
court held that a former police chief's testimony that a property manager's
handling of a resident's apartment key amounted to gross negligence was
"not objectionable because it embrace[d] an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact."' 291 In a suit by a discharged employee against her former
employer alleging retaliatory firing under the Whistle Blower Act,292 the
Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of expert testimony "based
on the facts provided, that [the discharged employee] had been the victim of
retaliation." 293 However, whether a beneficiary under a will exerted undue
influence on a testator was held to be "a question of ultimate fact for the fact
finder," and lay witness testimony was excluded, where the lay opinions
were held "neither rationally based on his perceptions nor are they particu-
larly helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination
of the undue influence issue."'294
E. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 705 governs the disclosure of facts or data
underlying expert opinion. 295 Rule 705 provides that the expert may dis-
close on direct examination the facts or data underlying his opinion. 296 One
court during the Survey period held expert affidavits to be "not competent
summary judgment evidence because they state[d] mere conclusions and
fail[ed] to meet the requirements" of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
166a(f).297 In so holding, the court rejected what it called an "inartfully
drafted" argument that Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 705 did "not require
an expert to testify to all the information upon which he has relied for his
conclusions, in order to give an expert opinion. '298
289. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 704.
290. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987).
291. Berry Property Management, Inc. v. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d 644, 667 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1993, writ granted).
292. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993), repealed by Acts
1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 46(1).
293. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136, 149 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ requested).
294. Green v. Earnest, 840 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
295. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 705.
296. Id.
297. Jordan v. Geigy Pharmaceuticals, 848 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1992, no writ).
298. Id. at 180 n.2.
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F. EFFECT OF OPINION TESTIMONY
One court during the Survey period reiterated the well established princi-
ple that a "trier of fact may believe or disbelieve any witness, may resolve
any inconsistencies in testimony of any witness, and may accept lay testi-
mony over that of experts. '299 A case during the Survey period held that
the "jury is the sole judge of the weight and credibility to be given to each
witness's testimony," and "[w]hen the jury relies on expert opinion, the jury
may regard that opinion as conclusive, if it is otherwise credible and free
from contradiction and inconsistencies. ,,300 In neither of these cases was the
expert testimony sufficiently conclusive to preclude submission to the jury.
VIII. ARTICLE VIII - HEARSAY
A. IDENTIFYING HEARSAY
Whether a record or statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
constitutes hearsay is often difficult to determine. 30 1 Specifically, "[h]earsay
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted."' 30 2 Exceptions to this general rule are set forth in Rules 803 through
806.
303
During the Survey period, many Texas appellate courts considered
whether proffered evidence was hearsay. In a suit to terminate parental
rights, statements of children made to Department of Human Services
Worker that their parents committed acts that were sexually and emotion-
ally abusive were hearsay. 3°4 In a tenant's suit against an apartment owner
for conversion of his personal property, the tenant's testimony that the de-
fendant was the owner of the apartment was hearsay where the tenant ad-
mitted that the sole source of his knowledge of the ownership was acquired
from statements made to him by third parties. 305
Held not to be hearsay were alleged "dope notes" in a car, which were
offered in a forfeiture proceeding "to show that the vehicle contained a pad
with 'dope notes' ,,;306 newspaper articles to show not their truth or falsity
but to show that city council made accusations against its representatives,
299. In re S.H., 846 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
300. Temple Eastex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied). See also Gober v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
301. Rules 801-06 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence comprehensively define the Hear-
say Rule and its exceptions. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 801-06. Additionally, "[a] witness may not
testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has
personal knowledge of the matter." TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 602.
302. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by law." TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 802.
303. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803-06.
304. James v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 836 S.W.2d 236, 242-43 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, no writ).
305. Brekalo v. Ballard, 836 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
306. $445.00 in U.S. Currency and One 1976 Chevrolet Automobile, VIN IZ37L6S428075
v. State, 856 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
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and to show what a city's citizens were reading at the time;30 7 an owner's
opinion of the market value of the use of her automobile for one month, even
though her opinion was based on hearsay; 308 and a wife's testimony that a
Mexican judge had pronounced her divorced from her first husband, when
offered to prove not the fact of her divorce but her state of mind. 309
B. STATEMENTS THAT ARE NOT HEARSAY
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e) excludes from the definition of hear-
say prior statements by a witness, 310 admissions by a party opponent, 311 and
depositions. 312
1. Admissions by Party-Opponent
a. Judicial Admissions
A judicially admitted fact does not require supporting evidence and the
judicial admission establishes the fact as a matter of law, thereby precluding
the fact finder from making any contrary findings. 313 A judicial admission is
actually a substitute for evidence. 314 The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence,
while not specifically distinguishing judicial admissions from other admis-
sions, treat admissions not as exceptions to the hearsay rule, but rather as
statements that are not hearsay. 315
A party's testimony can have the effect of a judicial admission and pre-
clude that party's recovery if it satisfies the requirements cited in Griffin v.
Superior Insurance Co.316 Griffin required that "the declaration relied upon
was made during the course of a judicial proceeding"; "[t]hat the statement
is contrary to an essential fact embraced in the theory of recovery or defense
asserted by the person giving the testimony"; "[t]hat the statement was de-
liberate, clear and unequivocal"; "[tihat giving of conclusive effect to the
declaration will be consistent with public policy"; and that the statement is
not also destructive of the opposing parties theory of recovery. 317 During
the Survey period, several Texas appellate courts held that admissions in a
307. City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 773, 791 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1992, writ denied).
308. Star Houston, Inv. v. Kundak, 843 S.W.2d 294, 298-99 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ).
309. Chandler v. Chandler, 842 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
310. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 801(e)(1).
311. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 801(e)(2).
312. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 801(e)(3).
313. RoY R. RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE: TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
l(a) § 1127 at 277 (3d ed. 1980).
314. Id. at 279.
315. TEX. R. CiV. EvID. 801(e)(2).
316. 161 Tex. 195, 338 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1960).
317. 338 S.W.2d at 419.
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pleading,318 a brief,319 and testimony3 20 all precluded recovery by the party
making the various admissions. Consistent with Griffin's requirement that
testimonial admissions be deliberate, clear, and unequivocal, a husband's
statement at his deposition that he was "not aware of anything" that his wife
did to cause her own death was not a judicial admission, because "lack of
personal knowledge of a fact does not conclusively negate the existence of a
fact." 321
b. Prior Pleadings
Admissions made in superseded pleadings lose their binding force as judi-
cial admissions. 322 Admissions in abandoned pleadings do, however, have
value as evidentiary admissions and can be introduced into evidence. 323
During the Survey period, one court affirmed the admission of a prior plead-
ing of a party in a separate unrelated lawsuit because it contained statements
that were inconsistent with various positions taken in the instant lawsuit. 324
2. Admission by Party Opponent - Specific Examples
In a wrongful death action arising from drowning of a motorist swept
away from the street by flood waters, a former city director of public works
directed an employee not to put a low water crossing sign on a portion of the
street where a motorist was drowned when crossing water during flooding.
The direction was held to be an admission by the city as a party opponent
under Rules 801 (e)(2)(C) & (D), where the employee working under the for-
318. Flores v. Texas Dep't of Health, 835 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ de-
nied) (Health Department's admission that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting
ground water table under landfill in an action challenging a permit for expansion of the
county's solid waste disposal site).
319. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. City of Corpus Christi, 850 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (taxpayer's admission in its brief that it "held" mobile home
units "as a secured party on the January 1 in question" was sufficient evidence to support
imposition of liability against taxpayer for delinquent property taxes for year listed).
320. Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993,
writ requested) (admission by sole stockholder of feedlot that feedlot manager had authority to
enter transaction with trust established that manager's acts were within the scope of his em-
ployment and were therefore authorized or ratified); Pako Corp. v. Thomas, 855 S.W.2d 215
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, no writ) (owner's testimony regarding the time in which she discov-
ered defect in photo processing equipment).
321. Rampel v. Wascher, 845 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ de-
nied) (quoting Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990,
writ denied).
322. See, e.g., Corsi v. Nolana Dev. Ass'n, 674 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi), rev'd on other grounds, 682 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1984). Admissions in abandoned plead-
ings are evidence that a jury is entitled to consider, and the probative value of the admission
against interest is a question of fact for the jury. See Valadez v. Barrera, 647 S.W.2d 377, 382-
83 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ). Although an admission in an abandoned plead-
ing ceases to bind the pleader, such pleading remains "a statement seriously made, and it can
be introduced in evidence as an admission." Id.
323. Id.
324. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., 839 S.W.2d 866, 874 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1992, writ granted). See also Annesley v. Tricentrol Oil Trading, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 908
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (superseded pleading properly admitted
to impeach party's testimony).
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mer director had an official duty to respond truthfully to the new director's
inquiry, where properly marking streets was clearly within the employee's
official duties, and where the former director was authorized to speak about
marking street as low water crossing.325 In a negligent case holding a prior
statement by the plaintiff describing the accident for the police to be a judi-
cial admission, one court explained that unlike the rule governing prior
statements by a witness, 326 there is no inconsistency prerequisite to admissi-
bility of statements of parties.327
C. PROBATIVE VALUE OF HEARSAY ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 802 provides that "[i]nadmissible hearsay
admitted without objection shall not be denied probative value merely be-
cause it is hearsay. ' 328 During the Survey period, two appellate courts held
that the hearsay objection was waived where it was not asserted in a trial
court, and that "[e]ven hearsay evidence, if admitted without objection, will
be not be denied some probative force."' 329
D. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: AVAILABILITY OF
DECLARANT IMMATERIAL
1. Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(3) admits into evidence, as exceptions to
the hearsay rule, statements of the declarant's "then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition. ' 330 During the Survey period,
one court held that in a suit to set aside a divorce decree on the grounds that
their marriage was void, the wife's testimony that a Mexican judge had pro-
nounced her divorced from her first husband was excepted from the applica-
tion of the hearsay rule as a statement of her then existing state of mind, if
offered to prove that she reasonably believed she was divorced from her first
husband.33' In a suit to terminate parental rights, another court held that
statements of children made to a Department of Human Services worker
that parents had committed acts that were sexually and emotionally abusive
of the children were hearsay and did not fall under the state of mind excep-
tion because the statements did not relate to the children's state of mind at
325. City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 856 S.W.2d 552, 560-61 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1993, writ granted).
326. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 801(e)(1).
327. Waldon v. City of Longview, 855 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, no writ).
328. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 802.
329. City of Los Fresnos v. Gonzalez, 848 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1993, no writ). See also De La Garza v. Salazar, 851 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1993, no writ); Eads v. American Bank, N.A., 843 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no
writ) (in a summary judgment proceeding, where record does not reflect that the court ruled
on a hearsay objection to summary judgment evidence, the appellate court cannot determine
whether the trial court considered the hearsay in granting the judgment; therefore, the ob-
jected-to evidence remains part of the summary judgment evidence unless an order sustaining
the objection is reduced to writing, signed, and entered).
330. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803(3).





Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(6) governs the introduction of records of
regularly conducted activities, commonly known as business records.
333
Rule 803(6) requires that the records be kept "in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity" by a person with knowledge of the recorded
information and as a regular practice of the business.334 In a former em-
ployee's action against the former employer to recover on a promissory note,
documents that included a bank deposit slip, a copy of a bank statement, a
ledger tape, and an exhibit relating to an inheritance checks sent to the for-
mer employee's wife was admissible under Rule 803(6) because the former
employee's testimony established the Rule 803(6) criteria.335 Absent the au-
thentication required by Rule 803(6), hearsay records were not admissible
either as trial evidence336 or as summary judgment evidence. 337
3. Learned Treatises
Statements contained in learned treatises are admissible as exceptions to
the hearsay rule "[t]o the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
on cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination," if "es-
tablished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness
or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice." 338 In Carter v. Steere
Tank Lines339 the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that cross-examination of
an expert witness with a learned treatise is "limited to publications which the
witness recognizes as authoritative or publications upon which expert has
relied. ' ' 34° Although prior to the promulgation of the Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence, an expert could be cross-examined with only those learned trea-
tises that the expert recognized as authoritative. 341 Under Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 803(18), an expert witness cannot "at the outset block cross-
examination by refusing to concede reliance or authoritativeness. '342 If an
expert refuses to admit the authoritativeness of a treatise, its authority may
be established "by other expert testimony or by judicial notice." 343
332. James v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 836 S.W.2d 236, 243 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, no writ).
333. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(6).
334. Id.
335. Texmarc Conveyor Co. v. Arts, 857 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
336. Sholdra v. Bluebonnet Say. Bank, F.S.B., 858 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1993, writ requested).
337. Coleman v. United Say. Ass'n of Tex., 846 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1993, no writ).
338. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(18).
339. 835 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
340. Id. at 182.
341. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949); Webb v. Jorns, 530 S.W.2d
847, 856-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e).
342. FED. R. EvID. 803(18) advisory committee's note.
343. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(18).
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4. Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(20) provides that "[r]eputation in a
community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general his-
tory important to the community," are admissible as exceptions to the hear-
say rule.344 In an easement dispute between a land owner and his neighbors,
one court of appeals held that a neighbor's testimony of a claimed oral agree-
ment between his grandfather and the land owner's predecessor in title
granting an easement to the neighbor's family over a road located on the
land owner's property were properly excluded from trial.3 45 In this case,
there was "no contention of the community's interest in or the community's
knowledge of the ... claim," "no contention of existence of general reputa-
tion within the community concerning this right of access," and "no proof of
recognized 'vehicles of reputation' " concerning the alleged easement. 346
5. Judgment of Previous Condition
"Evidence of a judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty...
adjudging a person guilty of a felony" is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule "to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment of convic-
tion," although "[t]he pendency of an appeal renders such evidence inadmis-
sible."' 347 In Francis v. Marshall,348 a contingent beneficiary's declaratory
judgment action that she was entitled to life insurance policy proceeds be-
cause of the primary beneficiary's conviction for murdering the insured, the
Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that the husband's conviction
for murder of the wife was properly before the probate court and county
courts under Rule 803(22) and that the Probate Code required the probate
court to bar the husband from recovering any proceeds.
6 Statements Against Interest
A statement that was so contrary to the declarant's interest at the time it
was made "that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true" is admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(24). 349 Where a
statement was not against interest at the time it was made, it was not admis-
sible as a statement against interest.350 Rule 803(24) also provides that state-
ments that tend to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability can be
statements against interest.35 In an election contest, affidavits of illegal vot-
344. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803(20).
345. Robert v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
346. Id.
347. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(22).
348. 841 S.W.2d 51, 53-54 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
349. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(24).
350. Travelers Co. v. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708, 714 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
351. TEX. R. Cv. EvID. 803(24).
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ers were held properly admitted as statements against interest.3 52 In another
case, ex parte affidavits obtained by police officers from a defendant's co-
arrestees during custodial investigation were admissible to establish that con-
trolled substances were consumed in a vehicle so as to subject the vehicle to
forfeiture, even though the affidavits were to a certain extent self-serving,
because numerous statements contained in the affidavits were against the
affiants' penal interest. 353
IX. ARTICLE IX - AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 901 requires authentication or identification
of evidence as a condition precedent to admitting the offered evidence. 354
The authentication requirement "is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. ' 355 In
First Heights Bank, F.S.B. v. Gutierrez356 the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals held that documents in the files of an insolvent savings and loan in
1986 were sufficiently authenticated. 357 Authentification was satisfied by the
testimony of a auditor who "testified that he examined [the] files in August
of 1986 and he confirmed that the information found in the summaries was
in the loan files at that time."' 358 Other ways were by the testimony of a
Federal Home Loan Bank examiner who "testified that he found the same
information in the files in early 1987" and because the documents were
found in the successor's files in 1990 in response to a request for produc-
tion.359 The examiner of the successor's files, who testified that he was told
the files were obtained from the insolvent predecessor by an answer to a
request for admission admitting that the successor took possession of the
files and business records of the solvent predecessor was another method of
authentication, as was the testimony of an employee of both the insolvent
predecessor and successor savings and loans who is familiar with the files,
who testified that the successor preserved the integrity of the files it received
from the predecessor. 36° In Seibert v. General Motors Corp. 361 the Houston
[14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that a television transcript was not au-
thenticated by the "reply letter doctrine," which allows the "genuineness of
the signature to a reply letter [to] be shown by circumstantial evidence. '362
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 902(6) treats printed materials purporting to
352. Green v. Reyes, 836 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no
writ).
353. A 1985 Cadillac Limousine v. State, 835 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
354. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 901(a).
355. Id.
356. 852 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).




361. 853 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).




be newspapers or periodicals as self-authenticating documents for which no
extrinsic evidence of authenticity is required as a condition precedent to ad-
missibility. 363 In Hardy v. Hannah 364 an election contest, the Austin Court
of Appeals affirmed the admission of copies of newspaper articles without
requiring extrinsic evidence of authenticity for purposes of showing that the
voters were provided information about the contents of the amendment at
issue.
X. ARTICLE X - CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs the admission of
the contents of writings, recordings, and photographs.3 65 "The admissibility
of a photograph is conditioned upon its identification by a witness as an
accurate portrayal of the facts, and on verification by that witness or a per-
son with knowledge that the photograph is a correct representation of such
facts. ' ' 366 In Reichhold Chemical, Inc. v. Puremco Manufacturing Co. 367 the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit photographs of an
underground storage tank, where the sponsoring witness said that the ex-
cluded photograph did not show the true condition of the tank at the time
that the damage was alleged to have occurred.
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 1006 provides that the otherwise admissible
contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that "cannot
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart,
summary, or calculation." 368 In First Heights Bank, F.S.B. v. Gutierre369
the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, without referencing Rule 1006, held
that a printed summary prepared in advance separating out each of nine
properties, denoting purchasers, purchase prices, size of liens, their appraisal
values, and projected annual and operating incomes, based on documents
found in the files of an insolvent plaintiff's savings and loan, was properly
admitted.
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
During the Survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court regarding
the interpretation of the Real Estate Licensing Act in Boyert v. Tauber.370
The Texas Supreme Court held that in an action to recover a real estate
commission based on a document signed by a purchaser acknowledging a
debt to "outside brokers" but not providing a complete listing of names,
parol evidence may not be permitted to identify a broker to whom a commis-
363. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 902(6).
364. 849 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex. App,-Austin 1992, writ denied).
365. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1001-1008.
366. Davidson v. Great Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312, 314-15 (Tex. 1987).
367. 854 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
368. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1006.
369. 852 S.W.2d 596, 617 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ requested).
370. 834 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. 1992).
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sion was owed. 371 The supreme court further held that the sale of real prop-
erty does not, under the doctrine of partial performance, "corroborate the
name of the broker" for purposes of the statutory writing requirement,
"when the name is not supplied by a memorandum of the agreement be-
tween the broker and the person who [was] to pay the commission. '372
Several courts during the Survey period excluded parol evidence to inter-
pret an unambiguous written contract. 373 Where neither party argued that a
covenant in a contract was ambiguous but disagreed on its meaning, one
court, finding no ambiguity in the covenant, excluded parol evidence, noting
that parol evidence is "not admissible to create ambiguity or to give the
contract a different meaning. ' 374 One court held that the term "hail" as
used in the casualty policy was "susceptible to more than one reasonable
construction" and was ambiguous, and therefore affirmed the admission of
extrinsic evidence to determine the intended meaning of the term in a declar-
atory judgment action regarding whether the insured's property damage fell
within the policy coverage for damage caused by hail.375
It is well established that parol evidence is admissible to show fraud in the
inducement of a written contract. 376 To establish fraud in the inducement
sufficient to permit an exception to the parol evidence rule, there must be a
showing of some type of trickery, deceit, or device employed. 377 Absent
such trickery or fraud, there will be no showing of fraudulent inducement. 378
Where fraudulent inducement was shown, two courts during the Survey pe-
riod permitted parol evidence to vary the term of an unambiguous written
contract. 3
79
371. Id. at 62-63.
372. Id. at 63.
373. Thompson v. Chrysler First Business Credit Corp., 840 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 1992, no writ); West Gathering Co. v. Exxon Corp., 837 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-El Paso),
rev'd on other grounds, No. D-3041, 1993 WL 233407 (Tex. June 30, 1993); Johnson v. Dale,
835 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ) (parol evidence was inadmissible to prove
location of easement at variance with unambiguous description and deed).
374. General Devices, Inc. v. Bacon, 836 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991),judg-
ment vacated, 830 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. 1992) (order published by the Texas Supreme Court June
3, 1992).
375. Commonwealth Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Downs, 853 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1993, writ denied).
376. See Thompson v. Chrysler First Business Credit Corp., 840 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-
1992, no writ); Tracy v. Annie's Attic, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ
denied).
377. See, e.g,, Clark v. Dedina, 658 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983,
writ dism'd) (fraudulent inducement by payee to maker of promissory note).
378. Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 725 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
379. Southampton Min. Corp. v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 846 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (admitting false representations made after a letter
agreement to show fraud both before and after signing the agreement); Tracy v. Annie's Attic,
Inc., 840 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
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